Which interest rate scenario is the worst one for a bank? Evidence from a tracking bank approach for German savings and cooperative banks by Memmel, Christoph
Which interest rate scenario is the worst
one for a bank?
Evidence from a tracking bank approach for
German savings and cooperative banks
Christoph Memmel
Discussion Paper
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies
No 07/2008
Discussion Papers represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. 
 
 
Editorial Board:   Heinz  Herrmann 
    Thilo  Liebig 

















Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,  
Postfach  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main 
 
Tel +49  69 9566-1 
Telex within Germany  41227, telex from abroad  414431 
 
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address or via fax  +49 69 9566-3077
Internet http://www.bundesbank.de  
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated. 
ISBN  978-3–86558–404–5  (Printversion) 
ISBN  978-3–86558–405–2  (Internetversion) Abstract
Interest income is the most important source of revenue for most of the
banks. The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of di￿erent interest rate
scenarios on the banks’ interest income. As we do not know the interest rate
sensitivity of real banks, we construct for each bank a portfolio with a similar
composition of its assets and liabilities, called ’tracking bank’. We evaluate the
e￿ect of 260 historical interest rate shocks on the tracking banks of German
savings banks and cooperative banks. It turns out that a sharp decrease in
the steepness of the yield curve has the most negative impact on the banks’
interest income.
JEL classi￿cation: G12, G21
Keywords: Interest Rate Risk, Stress Testing
1Non technical Summary
Interest income is the most important source of revenue for most banks. Stress
testing concerning the banks’ interest rate income is therefore of great importance.
Individual banks can carry out such stress tests relatively easily because they have
the necessary information (future cash ￿ows and the maturity structure of the assets
and liabilities). In contrast, outsiders have to estimate the maturity structure of the
assets and liabilities from stock price changes or balance sheet data. One goal of
this study is to estimate and predict those portions of a bank’s interest income that
arise from term transformation, ie the portion of interest rate income due to credit
spreads and margins is not considered. This is done with the help of tracking banks.
A tracking bank is a portfolio of bonds that has the same maturity structure of assets
and liabilities as the real bank and that otherwise behaves completely passively. The
tracking banks then serve as a means to ￿nd out which interest rate scenario has
the most negative impact on the banks’ interest income. To do so, the impact of
260 di￿erent historical interest rate scenarios on the tracking banks are analysed.
Under the assumption that the real bank is hit by an interest rate shock in the same
way as the tracking bank, one can determine the worst interest rate scenario. From
the empirical study for German savings and cooperative banks, we can infer the
following results: (i) The tracking banks are able to track the interest income of the
corresponding real banks rather accurately. (ii) The interest rate scenario with the
most harmful impact on the banks’ interest income turns out to be a movement of
the term structure in which the short-term interest rates go up sharply and the long-
term interest rates remain almost unchanged. This corresponds to a sharp decrease
in the steepness of the term structure.
2Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Der Zins￿berschuss ist f￿r die meisten Banken die wichtigste Ertragsquelle. Stress-
tests in Bezug auf den Zins￿berschuss sind daher von wesentlicher Bedeutung. Die
einzelnen Banken k￿nnen solche Stresstests relativ einfach durchf￿hren, weil ih-
nen die notwendigen Informationen (zuk￿nftige Zahlungsstr￿me und die Laufzeit-
struktur der Forderungen und Verbindlichkeiten) vorliegen. Au￿enstehende dagegen
m￿ssen die Laufzeitstruktur der Forderungen und Verbindlichkeiten auf Grundlage
von Aktienkurs￿nderungen oder Jahresabschl￿ssen sch￿tzen.
Ein Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht darin, aus bilanziellen Daten denjenigen Teil des
Zins￿berschusses einer Bank zu sch￿tzen und vorherzusagen, der sich aus der Fris-
tentransformation ergibt, d.h. derjenige Teil des Zins￿berschusses bleibt unber￿ck-
sichtigt, der auf Risikopr￿mien und Margen zur￿ckgeht. Dies geschieht mit Hilfe von
sogenannten Tracking Banken. Bei einer Tracking Bank handelt es sich um ein Port-
folio aus Anleihen, das dieselbe Laufzeitstruktur der Forderungen und Verbindlichkei-
ten aufweist wie die entsprechende reale Bank und sich ansonsten vollkommen
passiv verh￿lt. Die Tracking Banken dienen dann dazu, herauszu￿nden, welches
Zinsszenario den negativsten Ein￿uss auf das Zinsergebnis einer Bank hat. Dazu
werden die Auswirkungen von 260 verschiedenen historischen Zinsszenarien auf die
Tracking Banken untersucht. Unter der Annahme, die reale Bank werde von dem
Zinsschock in der gleichen Weise getro￿en wie die entsprechende Tracking Bank,
l￿sst sich so das ung￿nstigste Zinsszenario ermitteln.
Aus der empirischen Untersuchung f￿r deutsche Sparkassen und Kreditgenossen-
schaften lassen sich folgende Ergebnisse ableiten: 1. Die Tracking Banken k￿nnen
den Zins￿berschuss der entsprechenden realen Banken ziemlich genau nachzeichnen.
2. Als Zinsszenario mit den negativsten Auswirkungen auf den Zins￿berschuss der
Banken stellt sich eine Bewegung der Zinsstrukturkurve heraus, bei der die kurzfristi-
gen Zinsen stark ansteigen und die langfristigen Zinsen nahezu unver￿ndert bleiben.
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4Which Interest Rate Scenario is the Worst one for
a Bank?
Evidence from a Tracking Bank Approach for
German Savings and Cooperative Banks1
1 Introduction
For most banks, interest income is by far the most important source of revenue.
Stress testing concerning the banks’ interest rate income is therefore an important
issue.2 The aim of this paper is twofold: ￿rst, to present a method that allows es-
timation and forecasting of a bank’s interest income, using accounting information
and, second, to apply this method to ￿nd out which interest rate scenario is most
harmful for a bank.
The idea is as follows: We do not know the consequences of an interest rate shock
for a real bank, because we lack information about its future cash ￿ows. Therefore,
for each real bank, we construct a bank with a similar maturity composition, called
’tracking bank’, and we presume that the real bank and its tracking bank are hit by
an interest shock in the same way. Analyzing the e￿ects of an interest rate shock
on the tracking banks, we transfer the results to the real banks.
The method of determining the interest sensitivity is comparable to performance
measurement in portfolio theory: To measure the performance of a fund, one com-
poses a portfolio with the same systematic risk (see, for example, Jensen (1968)) as
1The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and need not re￿ect the opinions
of the Deutsche Bundesbank. I thank Oliver Entrop, Barry Williams and the participants at the
Deutsche Bundesbank’s research seminar and the SGF 2008 Annual Meeting for helpful comments.
2The banking crises in the US during the eighties and early nineties was in part due to interest
rate risk. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997) more than 9% of all
banks in the US failed during this crisis.
1the fund under consideration. The loadings of the systematic risk factor(s) 3 allow us
to judge the extent to which the fund’s return is determined by certain risk factors.
The systematic risk factors in our case are the yields of investment strategies that
consist in investing in default-free bonds of di￿erent maturities.
Having established a tracking bank for each German savings bank and cooperative
bank, we calculate the change in the interest income for each tracking bank for 260
historical interest rate scenarios in Germany.
It turns out that our tracking bank approach is able to explain a substantial part
of the cross sectional and time series variation of a bank’s (net) interest income.
Concerning the worst interest rate scenario, we ￿nd that a scenario with a sharp
decrease in the steepness of the yield curve, ie the short-term rates go up sharply
and the long-term rates barely move, has the most negative impact on the bank’s
net interest income in the year after the shock and in the second year after the shock.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview of the literature
in this ￿eld. In Section 3, we describe the model, and Section 4 gives a description
of the data. Section 5 states the estimation results, and Section 6 is about ￿nding
the interest rate scenario with the worst impact on the banks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature on the banks’ interest income.
First, we present a new method to estimate a bank’s interest rate risk exposure that
arises from term transformation. Our innovation is that we model the banks’ inter-
est income with tracking banks instead of interest rates. Second, we contribute to
the literature on stress testing of the banks’ interest income.
Provided the banks’ future cash ￿ows and the maturity composition of their assets
and liabilities are known, the income from term transformation is relatively easy
to determine. However, outsiders lack this information. Therefore, many studies
rely on stock returns or on accounting-based data to assess a bank’s exposure to
3See Sharpe (1963) for a one-factor-model and Fama and French (1992) for a three-factor-model.
2interest rate risk arising from term transformation (For approaches based on stock
returns, see Staikouras (2003) for an overview and Czaja et al. (2006) for a recent
application; for accounting-based approaches, see Houpt and Embersit (1991) and
Sierra and Yeager (2004)).
Often, the economic value perspective is chosen, which estimates the loss in the
bank’s present value given a certain change in the yield curve. The earnings per-
spective is common as well (see, for example, van den End et al. (2006)), especially
when analyzing traditional commercial banking as the business model and when
analyzing the short term e￿ects on the pro￿t and loss account. 4 In this paper, we
choose the earnings perspective and not the economic value perspective for two rea-
sons. First, we look at small and medium-sized banks which are primarily engaged
in commercial banking. Second, we are interested in the e￿ects of the interest rate
changes on the banks’ pro￿t and loss accounts in the near future, ie in an horizon
of one or two years.
Mostly, the accounting information of one point in time is used to assess the banks
exposure to interest rate risk. A counter-example is the work by Entrop et al.
(2008). They use time series of accounting information and they can show that this
additional information considerably improves the estimation of the bank’s duration
gap. Their calculation is, however, time-consuming, involves quadratic program-
ming and works best when there are no structural breaks in the time series of the
bank’s balance sheet data. In this paper, we use the banks’ accounting information
of one point in time. The neglect of the time series information may reduce the
precision of our estimates. However, the calculation is much less time-consuming
and there does not arise the question of how to deal with banks for which there
are fewer observations than the length of the time series. This question is relevant
because there was a merger wave among German savings and cooperative banks in
the period under consideration (See K￿tter (2005)).
To assess the stability of the ￿nancial system, many central banks in Europe carry
4For a more detailed discussion of the the two di￿erent perspectives see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2004).
3out interest rate risk stress tests using information of the banks’ balance sheets. 5
The methods described in this paper can help to design scenarios for interest rate
stress tests and to interpret the results.
3 Modelling Interest Income and Expenses
For each bank, we create a passively behaving bank with a similar maturity struc-
ture. This bank is called a ’tracking bank’ and serves us as an approximation of the
respective real bank.6 The tracking bank is assumed to follow a passive, station-
ary business model, ie it reinvests the funds that become due in investments of the
same kind: when a ￿ve-year-loan matures, the bank hands out a new loan with ￿ve
years of maturity. The same applies to the bank’s ￿nancing. In detail, we have the
following assumptions.
1. The composition of the tracking bank’s balance sheet remains unchanged in
the course of time. Whenever a loan or a bond matures, the bank replaces it
with a loan or a bond of the same initial time to maturity.
2. In theory, this replacement of maturing bonds and loans is continuous. How-
ever, we choose monthly discretion, ie the di￿erence between the points in
time t and t + 1 is one month.
3. There exists only one sort of ￿nancial instrument: bonds (or loans) of di￿erent
initial maturity that quote at par when issued and that redeem the whole
principal at maturity.
5The results are often reported in the central banks’ ￿nancial stability reports; see for instance
Deutsche Bundesbank (2006), De Nederlandsche Bank (2006) and Oesterreichische Nationalbank
(2006).
6To our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to model a bank’s interest income in this way. Giebel et al.
(1999), pp. 65-85, use a similar approach to replicate the cash ￿ows of non maturing deposits, for
instance savings accounts.
44. Whereas the principal is reinvested at maturity, the interest paid contributes to
the bank’s interest income (in the case of an asset) or to the interest expenses
(in the case of a liability).
5. All bonds and loans are default-free.
A tracking bank can be seen as a portfolio of investment strategies S(T). These
strategies S(T) consist in investing each month the constant part 1/T in par-yield-
bonds with maturity T. As one can see, these strategies are in accordance with the
assumptions of the stationary tracking bank: the money collected from redemption
in a certain month corresponds to the amount invested. The interest income is












where rt(T) is the yield of par bonds with maturity T in time t.7 In other words, the
yield of the Strategy S(T) equals the moving average of the interest rate (divided
by 12 to get the monthly yield).
As we only observe the interest income once a year, we sum up the last 12 monthly



















if t is a multiple of 12. From Equation (3) we see that the current interest income
of strategy S(T) is the weighted sum of past par-bond-yields with a maturity of T
months.
7We assume that the bonds pay each month 1/12 of the coupon.
5As mentioned above, the tracking bank is a portfolio of investment Strategies S(T).
Let w(Tk) with k = 1,...,K be the share of the total assets that is invested in the
strategy S(Tk), then we can calculate the tracking bank’s interest income (I) and






w(Tk) · Zt(Tk) with j = I, E (4)
For instance, assume the tracking bank revolvingly hands out loans of one-year,
four-year and six-year maturity and the weights of one-year-loans, four-year-loans




t = 0.2 · Zt(12) + 0.3 · Zt(48) + 0.45 · Zt(72).
Please note that the weights need not sum up to 100 percent: usually, banks hold
non-interest-bearing assets such as real estate and shareholdings as well. In case of
the liabilities the di￿erence to 100% is even greater, because the banks’ capital does
not count among the interest bearing liabilities. Further note that the maturity is
given in months (and not in years), ie the share of loans with an initial maturity of
four years is denoted as w(48) = 0.3.
Even if we knew the real bank’s maturity composition, the interest income and the
interest expenses of the real bank and the tracking bank would di￿er considerably.
Nevertheless, given the available information, the tracking bank approach seems to
be superior to other approaches (See Section 5).
Di￿erences may be due to the following reasons:
1. The real bank does not need to behave as passively as the tracking bank. It
is likely that the bank increases the term transformation in times of a steep
yield curve. Moreover, in times of an economic boom the bank will hand out
more loans than during recessions or ￿nancial crisis.
2. The real bank does not charge and pay the default-free interest rate of gov-
ernment bonds. In fact, one major function of a bank is to give customers
access to the capital market and to take on credit risk. Therefore, banks tend
6to charge more for the loans and pay less for the deposits than the interest
rate of the corresponding government bond. By contrast, the tracking bank
charges and receives the interest rate of default-free government bonds.
3. Real banks deal as well in much more complicated ￿nancial instruments than
straight, default-free bonds (See Assumptions 4 and 5). For instance, they are
engaged in o￿-balance-sheet activities, such as interest rate swaps and options.
Besides the di￿erences mentioned above, there is the problem that the maturity
composition of a bank’s assets and liabilities is not known exactly, at least to out-
siders and to the supervisory authorities. At best, the assets and liabilities are
broken down into di￿erent maturity brackets and into di￿erent lender and borrower
groups. The assumption is that the bank spreads their money equally over all the
di￿erent initial maturities (we assume initial maturities in six-month steps). For
instance, assume that a bracket covers all the loans to banks from more than one to
up to three years of initial maturity. This assumptions of spreading the loans equally
makes the bank in our example invest one-quarter into bank loans with 18-month,
24-month, 30-month and 36-month initial maturity, respectively.
Let xt,i,j be the normalized interest income contribution of the maturity bracket
j of asset class i to the normalized interest income ZI
t of the tracking bank, then




t = xt,1,1 + xt,1,2 + ... + xt,i,j + ... + xt,N,MN (5)
where N de￿nes the number of asset classes and Mi is number of brackets into which
the asset class is broken down. Let us return to the example from above, ie. the
bracket for loans with more than one year and up to three years of initial maturity.
Denote this bracket with i = 1 and j = 3. Assume that the assets in this bracket
account for 15% of the bank’s total assets. In this case, we obtain
xt,1,3 = 0.15 · (0.25 · Zt(18) + 0.25 · Zt(24) + 0.25 · Zt(30) + 0.25 · Zt(36)).
However, Equation (5) holds only for the tracking bank; in reality, we only observe
the interest income of the real bank, denoted by RI
t. As the tracking bank and
7the real bank do not act identically, the contributions xt,i,j do not enter with the




t = α + β1,1 xt,1,1 + β1,2 xt,1,2 + ... + βN,MN xt,N,MN + εt, (6)
where RI
t is the normalized interest income of the real bank. Please note that we
estimate the regression (6) as a panel regression, ie for reasons of simplicity, the
indexes for the banks are left out. Note as well that a similar equation is estimated
for the bank’s liabilities.
The better the assumptions made for the tracking bank ￿t to the real bank, the closer
the coe￿cients βi,j will be to one. The constant α will be estimated separately for
each bank. The higher this constant, the more the bank is able to charge margins
above the risk free interest rate.
4 Data
The Deutsche Bundesbank estimates the yield curve for government bonds using the
method of Svensson (1994).8 This method is a further development of the Nelson and
Siegel (1987) method and approximates the real yield curve by a function depending
on six parameters. We use monthly data of these parameter estimates from January
1980 to August 2007. Having established an entire yield curve for each month, we
calculate the implicit yield of bonds quoted at par and the year-end interest income
of the various investment strategies S(T). In Table 1, the summary statistics of the
interest income for the strategies S(T) with di￿erent initial maturity T is given. The
period is from 1990 to 2006, ie 17 observations. The mean return of the di￿erent
strategies increases with the initial maturity. In the period under consideration,
term transformation has been a lucrative source of revenue. The revolving invest-
ment in papers of six-month maturity yields on average an interest income of 4.62%,
8See Schich (1997) and Deutsche Bundesbank (1997).
8whereas the the revolving investment in 10-year(=120-month) bonds yields an in-
terest income of 6.56%. The relationship between mean return and initial maturity
is monotone and slightly concave, ie the increases in mean return become smaller
the longer the initial maturity. By increasing the initial maturity by one year, one
augments the mean interest income by approximately 20 basis points. At the same
time, the income volatility decreases as the initial maturity increases. However, this
result may be slightly misleading: not only the earning volatility counts but the
volatility of the economic value as well, and, from an economic value standpoint,
strategies based on bonds with long maturities are quite risky.
To construct the di￿erent interest scenarios, we make use of the same data set from
above. Starting in 1986, we calculate for each month and each maturity the year-to-
year change in the interest rate. This procedure yields 260 overlapping scenarios for
interest rate changes.9 In Table 2, the summary statistics is given concerning these
interest changes. The volatility of the interest rate changes is about 1 percent. As
expected, the volatility is the smaller, the longer the maturity. For the six-month
interest rate, the volatility is 1.22%, and it gradually goes down to 0.85% for the
volatility of the 10-year interest rate. Basel II stipulates an interest rate stress test
for the banks’ banking book. This stress test consists of an upward and downward
200 bp parallel shift of the yield curve or, equivalently, a parallel shift of the ￿rst
and 99th percentile of the yearly interest rate changes (See Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2004)). Looking at the corresponding percentiles in Table 2,
we see that the two alternatives lead to shocks of approximately the same severity,
especially when looking at the longer maturities. For short term interest rates, how-
ever, the year-to-year change may be up to 300 bp.
We restrict our analysis to the savings banks and to the cooperative banks in Ger-
many. The banks of these two sectors are relatively homogeneous; they account for
more than 80% of all German institutions and they generate the vast majority of
9Another possibility of constructing interest rate scenarios would be to analyze the dynamics
of the parameters that govern the yield curve (See Diebold and Li (2006)) instead of looking at
the entire yield curve. This approach would be especially relevant, in case one wanted to attach
probabilities to the scenarios.
9their business with the classical banking activities, ie by handing out loans and by
receiving deposits. In Table 3, we give summary statistics on the variable of interest,
ie the banks’ net interest income normalized to the banks’ total assets. 10 In 1998,
there was a major break in the time series. Therefore, we use the period from 1999
to 2006. During this period, the interest margin was 2.47% for the median bank.
However, from 2003 onwards, we see a decline in this margin. The number of banks
in the sample continuously fell from more than 2,500 in 1999 to about 1,600 in 2006.
This decrease in number was due to a merger wave in the German savings bank and
cooperative bank sector (See K￿tter (2005)).
The maturity composition of the banks’ assets and liabilities can only be approxi-
mately inferred from the data available to us. We make use of the information from
the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly balance sheet statistics. The monthly balance
sheet statistics are broken down into di￿erent assets and liabilities and into di￿erent
initial maturity brackets. Table 4 gives this breakdown of the initial maturities for
di￿erent assets and liabilities.
Additionally, we make assumptions concerning the distribution of the initial ma-
turities in the brackets (See Section 3): The maturities are assumed to be equally
distributed in the brackets in which the discretion is six months. However, there
are three exceptions: (i) For the brackets with daily maturity, we apply the strat-
egy S(3) based on the three-month interest rate to avoid the high volatility of the
overnight money interest rate. (ii) The longest maturity for the brackets more than
two years and more than ￿ve years is 96 months. (iii) For the savings accounts, we
assume a tracking portfolio that is composed of equal shares of the six-month- and
the 114-month-strategy (for the up to three month-bracket) and of equal shares of
12-month and 120-month strategy (for the more than three month-bracket).11
In Table 5, we report the composition of the banks assets and liabilities. On average,
10For more information on the Bundesbank’s banking data see Memmel and Stein (2008).
11From talks with practitioners of the savings banks and cooperative banks sector, we know
that the average duration for savings accounts is assumed to be approximately three years. There
are, however, more sophisticated approaches to determine the interest rate risk of of non-maturity
deposits, see for instance O’Brien (2000) and Ellis and Jordan (2001).
10the positions included in our analysis account for 91.4% of a bank’s assets and for
88.7% of the liabilities. By far the largest asset position is "loans to non-banks" (on
average 62.2% of total assets). Savings accounts account on average for one-third of
the banks’ funding, at least for the relatively small banks in our sample.
5 Estimation Results
We report the regression results for Equation (6). This equation was separately esti-
mated for the assets with the interest income as the dependent variable and for the
liabilities with the interest expenses as the dependent variable. Please note that we
additionally include as explanatory variables the coverage of assets (sum of assets
included) and the coverage of liabilities (sum of liabilities included) , respectively.
The Hausman (1978) test clearly rejects the hypothesis of a random-e￿ects model.
We therefore estimate a ￿xed e￿ects regression with heteroscedasticity robust co-
variance matrix. Table 6 gives the estimation results for the interest income. In
accordance with expectations, the estimated coe￿cients are all highly signi￿cantly
positive, but some of them di￿er signi￿cantly from one. The estimated coe￿cients
￿t especially well for the positions "Loan to non-banks"; here the coe￿cients are
close to one. The explanatory power is satisfactorily high as can be seen from the
di￿erent coe￿cients of determination (R-squared); the overall R-squared is 73%.
The corresponding estimation results for the liabilities are shown in Table 7. As
with the regression for the interest income, the coe￿cients are highly signi￿cant,
but di￿er from one. The cross-sectional explanatory power (R-squared between) is
a bit lower than in the case of the interest income (42.9% vs. 62.9%).
We are primarily interested in the net interest income. To see whether our method
is a real improvement, we compare its in-sample explanatory power with two al-
ternative models. The ￿rst alternative model consists in using the interest income
of the strategies S(12) and S(60) as explanatory variables. The second alternative
model uses dummies for each year to capture the interest rate dynamics. Let R
be the normalized net interest income of the real bank and let ˆ R be its in-sample
11estimate; we estimate the following ￿xed-e￿ects panel regression
Rt,i = α + β ˆ R
j
t,i + εt,i, (7)
where j denotes the three di￿erent methods to be compared, ie the method of
using a tracking bank, of using the interest income of the two strategies S(12) and
S(60) and of using year dummies. Table 8 shows that the proposed method of
using tracking banks leads to the best results. As we estimate Equation (7) as
a ￿xed-e￿ects-regression, there are three di￿erent coe￿cients of determination (in
the following R-squared, R-sq). The within R-squared states how well the model
can explain changes in the net interest income of a bank. The within R-squared
for the tracking bank model is 28.4% and is much higher than the respective R-
squared of the other two models (13.8% and 19.1%). The between R-squared tells
by how far the cross-sectional variation in the explanatory variables can explain the
cross-section of the banks’ net interest income. The tracking bank model is able to
explain roughly one-￿fth of the cross sectional variation in the net interest income;
the corresponding measures for the other two strategies are close to zero. 12 The
overall R-squared is the squared correlation between the net interest income of the
real bank and the ￿tted net interest income. This measure combines the time series
and cross-sectional goodness of ￿t. The tracking bank model yields a goodness of ￿t
measure of 22.3%, which is far above the ￿t for the other two models. We carried out
the same analysis using interest rates instead of the corresponding moving averages,
ie the interest incomes of the strategies S(T). The results were signi￿cantly in favor
of the interest incomes of the strategies S(T).
To sum up, to explain a banks’ net interest income, it is recommendable to include
the information contained in the monthly balance sheet statistics and to use moving
averages of interest rates instead of the interest rates themselves.
12As the methods Interest income of the two strategies S(12) and S(60) and Year dummies
have no cross sectional variation, their between R-squared should numerically be zero. However,
the panel is unbalanced and the missing values induce some cross sectional variation, so that the
between R-squared is numerically di￿erent from zero.
126 Looking for the Worst Interest Rate Scenario
In this section, we apply the tracking bank method to ￿nd out which interest rate
scenario is most harmful to the banks. The measure of harm is the change in the
standardized net interest income one year and two years after the interest rate shock,
respectively.
The procedure is as follows: We assume that the yield curve is unchanged from
August 2007 to December 2007. In January 2008, there will be a shock according
to one of the 260 historical scenarios. After the shock, the yield curve is assumed
to remain unchanged at the new level. For each of the 1,636 tracking banks and
each of the 260 interest rate scenarios, we calculate the net interest income for the
year 2008 and the year 2009, respectively. These interest margins are compared
with the interest margin in the case of no interest shock, the basis scenario, ie we
calculate the di￿erence between the income in a shock scenario and in the basis
scenario. This procedure yields 1,636 × 260 = 425,360 di￿erences in net interest
income. To condense the information, we apply two di￿erent criteria to ￿nd the
worst scenario: (i) For each of the 260 scenarios, we calculate the median of the
cross sectional change in the net interest income that is caused by a scenario. The
lower the median change in the net interest income, the worse is the scenario. (ii)
For each of the 1636 banks, we determine which of the 260 scenarios is the worst
one in 2008 and in 2009, respectively. The more often a scenario is named as the
worst one, the worse is the scenario.
Table 9 gives the median change in the net interest income for the ￿ve worst scenarios
according to criterion (i). The scenarios are labelled according to the month in which
the 12-month-period for the year-to-year-change ends. For instance, the scenario
called 1989-05 consists of the changes in the interest rates that occurred from May
1988 to May 1989. The number -0.276, for example, in the third column of Table 9
states, that the median standardized net interest income (= net interest income over
total assets) goes down by 0.276 percentage points. From Table 3 we see that the
median standardized net interest income is about 2.5%, ie the median change due to
the worst scenario causes a reduction of the net interest income by some 11%. Please
13note that the 260 shocks are overlapping and therefore not independent. That’s why
the ￿ve worst scenarios according to criterion (i) are clustered around spring 1989.
Whereas Table 9 makes a statement for the average (=median) tracking bank, it is
important to know if a scenario that is identi￿ed as severe for the average tracking
bank is severe for a large part of the banks as well. To answer this question, we
identi￿ed the worst scenario for each bank, and we counted how often each scenario
was identi￿ed as the worst one (criterion (ii)). Table 10 shows the ￿ve scenarios that
were most often found to be the worst ones. According to both criteria, scenario
1989-05 is by far the worst. The year-to-year change in the interest rates for this
scenario 1989-05 are shown in Figure 1. The curve for the interest rate changes is
relatively smooth. This smoothness is due to the fact that the Svennson-method
uses a function to approximate the actual yield curve.
From the Tables 9 and 10 as well as from Figure 1, we obtain the following statements
concerning the severity of interest rate shocks.
1. From an earnings perspective, the short term interest rates are crucial for
the severity of interest rate shocks. The worst of the 260 scenarios is a sharp
decrease in the steepness of the yield curve: Whereas the three-month-rate goes
up by more than three percentage points, the ten-year rate remains almost the
same (See Figure 1).
2. For nearly all of the tracking banks, and therefore presumably for nearly all
of the real banks, the worst scenario is the same: a sharp decrease in the
steepness of the term structure. For 1,610 out of the 1,636 tracking banks,
the scenario 1989-05 has the most negative impact on the net interest income
after one year.
3. The e￿ect of an interest rate shock is not restricted to the ￿rst year. It turns
out that the e￿ects become worse in the second year, as can be seen from
Table 9. In addition, the e￿ects become more dispersed and less uniform as
can be seen from Table 10.
14The Result 1 is not fully in line with the results of interest rate stress tests that
apply the economic value perspective as reported, for instance, in Deutsche Bun-
desbank (2006). When looking at the economic value, the changes in the interest
rates of longer maturities are crucial, and the changes in the short-term rates are
of secondary importance. It seems as though the earnings perspective and the eco-
nomic perspective look at the interest rate risk from di￿erent angles: Whereas the
economic value perspective stresses the present value of the current holdings, the
earnings perspective includes the future business as well. However, the earnings
perspective puts the emphasis only on the near future, whereas the economic value
perspective may give a more comprehensive picture of the bank’s situation.
The tracking bank approach of ￿nding the worst interest rate scenario relies on sev-
eral strong assumptions: for instance, that the tracking bank and the corresponding
real bank are hit by an interest rate stock in the same way, and that the composi-
tion of the assets and liabilities of a bank remains constant throughout the interest
rate shock. Moreover, we look only at the risk due to maturity mismatches, but we
neglect the indirect e￿ects of an interest rate change, such as increasing margins in
times of a boom. Nevertheless, the tracking bank approach seems to give valuable
insights into the sensitivity of the banks’ interest income to di￿erent interest rate
shocks.
7 Conclusion
It seems that, for a large part of German savings banks and cooperative banks,
the same interest rate scenario has the worst impact on their interest income: a
sharp decrease in the steepness of the yield curve, ie the interest rates of longer
maturities are of secondary importance, when looking at the next two years’ net
interest income. By contrast, when looking at the economic value of a bank, the
interest rate changes in the longer maturities seem to be more important. Further
work has to deal with the question of how to reconcile the economic value and the
earnings perspective.
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18Appendix: Tables and Figures
Maturity N. of obs. Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
6 17 4.62 2.37 2.06 9.16
12 17 4.72 2.27 2.21 8.92
24 17 4.99 2.06 2.50 8.83
48 17 5.49 1.62 3.17 8.15
72 17 5.90 1.30 3.92 7.54
120 17 6.56 0.96 4.68 7.66
Table 1: Summary statistics for the yearly interest income (in percent) for the
strategies S(T) with di￿erent initial maturity T (in months). Time period: from
1990 to 2006.
Matu- N. of Mean Standard Percentile
rity obs. deviation 1st 10th 90th 99th
6 260 -0.07 1.22 -2.54 -1.65 1.49 2.99
12 260 -0.07 1.21 -2.49 -1.64 1.44 3.11
24 260 -0.09 1.20 -2.79 -1.73 1.58 2.58
48 260 -0.12 1.08 -2.54 -1.56 1.50 2.08
72 260 -0.13 0.97 -2.03 -1.38 1.28 2.15
120 260 -0.14 0.85 -1.58 -1.11 1.04 2.07
Table 2: Year-to-year changes in the interest rate (in percentage points) for di￿erent
maturities (in months). Time period: from 1986-01 to 2007-08
19Year(s) N. of. Obs. 25th percent. Median 75th percent.
1999 2563 2.30% 2.55% 2.81%
2000 2314 2.20% 2.51% 2.80%
2001 2118 2.09% 2.37% 2.64%
2002 1967 2.21% 2.50% 2.77%
2003 1838 2.27% 2.56% 2.83%
2004 1769 2.22% 2.52% 2.79%
2005 1690 2.14% 2.43% 2.68%
2006 1636 2.01% 2.29% 2.52%
1999-2006 15895 2.18% 2.47% 2.74%
Table 3: Net interest income over total assets (= standardized interest income) of
German savings banks and cooperative banks.
Position 1st bracket 2nd bracket 3rd bracket 4th bracket
Assets
Loans to banks daily up to 1y 1y to 5y more th. 5y
Loans to non-banks up to 1y 1y to 5y more th. 5y
Bonds up to 1y 1y to 5y more th. 5y
Liabilities
Loans from banks daily up to 1y 1y to 2y more th. 2y
Loans from non-b. daily up to 1y 1y to 2y more th. 2y
Subordinated debt no breakdown
Saving accounts up to 3m more th. 3m
Table 4: Breakdown of the initial maturities of the banks’ assets and liabilities
























































N. of Obs. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Sum of assets included 15895 87.4% 91.4% 93.6%
Loan to banks 15895 5.9% 9.7% 14.8%
Loan to non-banks 15895 54.4% 62.2% 68.6%
Bonds 15895 11.5% 16.6% 23.1%
Sum of liabilities included 15895 85.4% 88.7% 90.9%
Loans from banks 15895 10.0% 14.4% 19.6%
Loans from non-banks 15895 30.1% 35.6% 41.7%
Subordinated debt 15895 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%
Saving accounts 15895 29.4% 34.9% 40.7%
Figure 1: Scenario 1989-05, year-to-year interest rate changes (from May 1988 to
May 1989) for di￿erent maturities
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Table 5: Composition of the savings and cooperative banks’ assets and liabilities
normalized to the banks’ total assets.Bracket Coe￿cient Stand. dev. t-statistics
Sum of assets incl. -0.006 0.001 -4.22
Loans to banks 1st 0.573 0.024 24.16
2nd 0.438 0.024 18.52
3rd 0.609 0.027 22.54
4th 0.516 0.030 17.22
Loan to 1st 0.991 0.035 28.59
non-banks 2nd 1.190 0.023 52.45
3rd 0.903 0.010 94.51
Bonds 1st 0.555 0.173 3.21
2nd 0.761 0.105 7.25
3rd 0.587 0.012 49.74




Number of observations 15895
banks 2579
Estimation ￿xed e￿ects
Table 6: Panel regression with ￿xed e￿ects; dependent variable: interest income
over total assets, White (1980)-correction for the standard errors.
22Bracket Coe￿cient Stand. dev. t-statistics
Sum of liabilities incl. 0.020 0.001 15.08
Loans from banks 1st 0.604 0.068 8.94
2nd 0.480 0.033 14.48
3rd 1.177 0.111 10.60
4th 0.831 0.015 57.00
Loans from non-banks 1st 0.173 0.013 13.60
2nd 0.718 0.014 50.46
3rd 0.882 0.043 20.69
4th 0.839 0.021 39.91
Subordinate debt 1.406 0.115 12.28
Savings accounts 1st 0.696 0.008 88.91
2nd 0.531 0.013 40.58




Number of observations 15895
banks 2579
Estimation ￿xed e￿ects
Table 7: Panel regression with ￿xed e￿ects; dependent variable: interest expenses
over total assets, White (1980)-correction for the standard errors.
Method R-sq within R-sq between R-sq overall
Tracking bank 0.284 0.195 0.223
Interest income of the 2 strat. S(12) and S(60) 0.138 0.019 0.028
Year dummies 0.191 0.022 0.036
Table 8: Goodness of ￿t for the three di￿erent methods according to Equation (7).
White (1980)-correction for the standard errors.
23Rank Net interest income 2008 Net interest income 2009
Scenario Change (median) Scenario Change (median)
1 1989-05 -0.276 1989-05 -0.338
2 1989-02 -0.252 1989-02 -0.285
3 1989-04 -0.232 1989-04 -0.280
4 1989-03 -0.224 1989-03 -0.253
5 1989-01 -0.209 1989-01 -0.252
Table 9: Median change in the banks’ standardized net interest income in percentage
points for the ￿ve worst scenarios.
Rank Net interest income 2008 Net interest income 2009
Scenario N. of. Banks Scenario N. of. Banks
1 1989-05 1610 1989-05 1489
2 1992-11 7 2001-01 72
3 1989-02 6 1995-12 34
4 1989-03 4 1989-09 14
5 1993-03 4 1993-03 8
Table 10: Number of banks for which the scenario named in the second column
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